Oysters, Ecosystems, and Persuasion by Rieser, Alison
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
Volume 18 | Issue 3 Article 3
May 2013
Oysters, Ecosystems, and Persuasion
Alison Rieser
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh
Part of the History Commons, and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law & the Humanities by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alison Rieser, Oysters, Ecosystems, and Persuasion, 18 Yale J.L. & Human. (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol18/iss3/3
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Alison Rieser*
INTRODUCTION
The Eldest Oyster winked his eye, and shook his heavy head.
Meaning to say he did not choose to leave the oyster bed.1
In his essay on the commons scholarship of Carol Rose, Michael Heller
deploys an epoch-spanning synopsis of Western society's passion for the
oyster to make his case for a Rose theorem.2 Professor Heller posits that
the work of Carol Rose sets out a testable theory: law emerges from and is
shaped by the interactions of human culture with nature and natural
resources. The oyster's survival across the ages, he suggests, is due to this
process, a "constantly shifting matrix of strategies, simultaneously public
and private, individual and community, and on their constant renegotiation
and interpolation."
Professor Heller's is indeed an engaging account, and he is certainly
correct that the oyster's story challenges the neoclassical economic
account of the evolution of property rights. But as an account of what the
oyster's story contributes to our ideas about common resources, it is
incomplete. And Heller surely has not gone far enough in looking at the
scholarship of Carol Rose from the point of view of the oyster. By failing
to bring the story into the twenty-first century, Heller misses most of what
the oyster's story tells us about human institutions.
3
By example and methodology Carol Rose shows us how to draw lessons
for our own times and environmental challenges by looking at history, at
Dai Ho Chun Distinguished Chair in Arts & Sciences, University of Hawai'i at Manoa,
Honolulu, Hawai'i and Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law, Portland, Maine (on
leave 2006).
1. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE (1872).
2. See Michael Heller, A Rose Theorem?, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 29 (2006).
3. It is not at all clear that the Eastern oyster has indeed survived. Crassostrea virginica is
estimated to be at less than 2% of its original abundance; its survival is threatened by disease, water
pollution, and loss of habitat, in addition to roughly two centuries of overexploitation. See NOAA,
NMFS, 90-Day Finding on a Petition to List the Eastern Oyster as Endangered or Threatened, 70 Fed.
Reg. 28510 (May 18, 2005).
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our customs, norms, and conceptions of property rights as they have
changed over time, and at the way we have been persuaded to think about
resources and our relationship to them. In this brief commentary, I will
attempt to tell a bit more of the oyster's story and that of Chesapeake Bay,
the vast North American estuary the oyster long ago colonized and shaped,
showing how particular voices have shaped our view of how best to
arrange ourselves in relation to natural resources and places.
I. THE MANY STORIES OF THE EASTERN OYSTER
Many have looked at the story of the oyster fisheries and drawn their
own conclusions. Some have seen only a tragedy; others have seen a
comedy. One of the earliest accounts of the tragedy of the common
resource was drawn from the history of the Maryland oyster fisheries in
the Chesapeake.4 Indeed, a fascinating story could be told just by
contrasting the different lessons people draw from the story of the oyster.5
The Chesapeake oyster fishery began its cycles of boom and bust and its
battles over rights to the oyster beds when New England oystermen went
south to find seed oysters to replenish their overfished beds.6 At the end of
the nineteenth century, the booming fishery had begun to decline
dramatically. One of the most important voices calling for enclosure of the
commons and a new regime based on private rights was that of William K.
Brooks, Professor Heller's interlocutor.
7
Brooks was not simply an oyster biologist and chronicler of the tragic-
4. See Charles H. Stevenson, The Oyster Industry of Maryland, BULLETIN OF THE U.S. FISH
COMMISSION, Vol. XII for 1892, 203-97 (1894) (describing the oyster fishery in words very similar to
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci.1243 (1968)); see also Francis T. Christy, Jr.,
The Exploitation of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Maryland Oyster Industry (1964)
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with University of Michigan).
5. Compare, e.g., Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P. Donnelly, Property Rights and Efficiency in
the Oyster Industry, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 521 (1975) (public ownership led to dissipation of rents while
private oyster fisheries thrived), with George D. Santopietro & Leonard A. Shabman, Can
Privatization Be Inefficient?: The Case of the Chesapeake Oyster Fishery, 26 J. ECON. ISSUES 407
(1992) (privatization would have destroyed the network of social relationships upon which the
oystermen depended and which they valued above all else).
Today, the oyster story should interest anyone considering whether commercial fisheries should be
privatized through the creation of individual fishing quotas, one of the new-fangled, property-like tools
in vogue and one which Carol Rose has contrasted with community-based management regimes. See
Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship and the Fishing Quotas
Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L.REV. 393 (1999) (describing the debate over transferable fishing quotas
and the absence of consideration of how quotas may affect ecosystem-based management); Carol M.
Rose, Common Property, Regulatory Property, and Environmental Protection: Comparing
Community-Based Management to Tradable Environmental Allowances, in THE DRAMA OF THE
COMMONS 233 (E. Ostrom ed., 2002).
6. V.S. Kennedy & L.L. Breisch, Maryland's Oysters: Research and Management, A Maryland
Sea Grant Publication, Number UM-SG-TS-81-04 (1981) at xii, available at http://www.mdsg.
umd.edu/oysters/research/mdoysters.html.
7. Heller, supra note 2, at 37. See generally Christine Kleiner, WK Brooks and the Oyster
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comedy of the Oyster Wars of the 1880s. 8 Brooks was the foremost
morphologist and embryologist of his time. Through patient experiments
and a sense that the leading French biologist who believed baby oysters
were hatched inside the shell had it wrong, Brooks worked out the
reproductive biology of the Eastern oyster.9 He found that oyster
fertilization occurs in the water and that the developing oyster larvae float
in the currents for a time before settling onto a suitable bottom. Brooks
believed the decline of the oyster fisheries would be stemmed if oystermen
could be convinced to take advantage of this life strategy. By cultivating
their own beds instead of fighting among themselves to take the greater
share from the common oyster beds, the watermen could ensure their
livelihoods as well as that of the oyster.
But Brooks's campaign for private oyster beds did not succeed. The
Maryland oystermen vehemently opposed privatization. They sued,
cajoled, threatened, and perhaps even bribed, although it is likely they did
not have to. Because the coastal counties of Maryland were over-
represented in the General Assembly, the tidewater representatives
blocked attempts to enact laws that would allow private individuals to
farm oysters in the Bay. 10
In neighboring Virginia, the property rights approach found a more
receptive audience." Largely due to the different ecological conditions in
the southern end of the Bay, Virginia's bay waters and tributaries were
excellent places for the production of seed oysters but not as well-suited
for growing oysters to market size. 2 Virginia watermen also resisted
privatization of the oyster beds, but Virginia lawmakers allowed a few to
obtain leases. The lessees' success encouraged others to restore the cultch
and plant oyster beds.
Roughly a century after W.K. Brooks made his discoveries and pleas for
bed cultivation, his privatization prescription was vindicated. In the 1970s,
economists Richard Agnello and Lawrence Donnelly compared the value
of oyster fisheries in Maryland, Virginia, Louisiana, and Mississippi. In
these states, some beds were managed by the state and others were owned
and managed by private individuals who had obtained title or leaseholds
from the state. Revenues from the private oyster beds were higher because
the oysters were allowed to grow over the course of the season rather than
8. W. K. Brooks, THE OYSTER, A POPULAR SUMMARY OF A SCIENTIFIC STUDY (2d rev. ed., The
Johns Hopkins University Press) (1905).
9. Kleiner, supra note 7, at 391.
10. Garrett Power, More About Oysters Than You Wanted to Know, 30 MD. L. REv. 199, 213-16
(1970).
11. John J. Alford, The Chesapeake Oyster Fishery, 65 ANNALS ASSOC. AMER. GEOGRAPHERS
229, 235 (1975).
12. Id. at 235 ("Although Virginia [and Maryland] watermen have similar attitudes, ecological
differences have made private culture more palatable in Virginia.").
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being harvested too early to generate the greatest profit. 3 Secure in their
rights to the beds, the owners could wait for higher prices and the
optimum harvest time. In the economists' view, the oyster story supplied
empirical evidence for H. Scott Gordon's model that ownership rights to
resources are important determinants of economic efficiency. 14
This account apparently has become the standard fare in economics
textbooks and the oyster something of a poster child for the campaign to
privatize the fishery commons.15 But another version of the oyster story is
equally instructive. The oystermen of the Chesapeake fought to retain the
open access character of the oyster fishery to preserve a way of life that
was deeply embedded in the tidal creek communities along the Bay's
tributaries. They fought against private property rights in the beds because
they did not want to become farmers or end up working for wealthy
cultivators on beds some distance from their homes. The oystermen
wanted to remain connected to the local beds their communities had
grown up around.'
6
Moreover, the privatization proposals of Brooks and his followers may
have failed to appeal due to the proponents' emphasis on the individual
aspect of the proposed private rights. Although accounts of the Oyster
Wars make the fishery seem more like a blood sport than a mere
livelihood, it is conceivable that proposed community-based property
rights in oyster beds might have fared better. As Carol Rose has suggested,
many resource users value the right of common access and scoff at the
notion that an individual owner will take better care of the resource.
17
Private property has at least one normative component that does not sit
well with some people. Its appeal to self-interest does not naturally
suggest that a resource will be husbanded. 8
13. Richard 1. Agnello & Lawrence P. Donnelly, Prices and Property Rights in the Fisheries, 42
S. ECON. J. 253, 259 (1975).
14. Id. at 261. See also Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P. Donnelly, Property Rights and
Efficiency in the Oyster Industry, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 521, 532-33 (1975). Gordon's model is
presented in H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery,
62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954).
15. See Santopietro and Shabman, supra note 5, at 408. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON &
DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 124 (1991) (In discussing Agnello and
Donnelly, stating that "[t]hese findings support the expectation that private property rights solve the
open-access problem.").
16. George D. Santopietro & Leonard A. Shabman, Can Privatization Be Inefficient?: The Case
of the Chesapeake Oyster Fishery, 26 J. ECON. ISSUES 407, 413-14 (1992). A similar story is presented
in BONNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: PROPERTY, LAW, AND ECOLOGY IN
NEW JERSEY HISTORY (1998) (tracing the American public trust doctrine to the oyster wars in New
Jersey in the early nineteenth century). But see James R. Rasband, The Public Trust Doctrine: A
Tragedy of the Common Law, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1335 (1999).
17. Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 176 (1998).
18. Carol M. Rose, Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics, 24
ENVTL. L. 1, 28 (1994).
[Supp.:49
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II. ECOSYSTEMS AND PERSUASION
But let us return to the Chesapeake. Having served indirectly as the
inspiration for the tragedy of the commons, the Bay has gone on to
become one of the most closely-watched managed ecosystems. A century
after W. K. Brooks urged Marylanders to privatize the oyster beds, the
Chesapeake became the focus of a major restoration effort.
The Chesapeake Bay Program is a network of cooperative,
intergovernmental, and private-public partnerships virtually unprecedented
in this country, though not out of proportion to the size of the task or to the
importance of the nation's largest estuary. Some argue that it is a model,
best-case scenario of collaboration and engagement of citizens, scientists,
politicians, and industries.' 9 Yet, despite this attention, the Bay gets a
failing grade in the annual report card on its environmental quality.20
Urban and agricultural runoff still fouls the Bay, despite the numerous
innovations in law and policy adopted by the Chesapeake partnership,
including a trading program for credits in nutrient loading reductions, a
newfangled form of regulatory property.2' What gives?
Again, Carol Rose's approach is informative. She explains that for
ecosystem management, you need a hook to get people's attention, such as
fish people eat, a charismatic species like the Pacific salmon, or a place
that people are attached to. 22 Hooks are good for getting people's attention
and seeing the value in viewing ecosystems as a whole. But, she warns,
they are not good as a management strategy. Relying on regulatory hooks
can lead to regulating things that are the most obvious to regulate, such as
the fishery, or a big, obvious point source of pollution, or a new land
subdivision.23 This focus actually undermines the message the public
needs to be persuaded to buy into: because the ecosystem has value as a
large, interactive system, its management requires looking at all of the
different parts. 24 When certain obvious targets are the focus, everyone else
is let off the hook and persuasion fails.
19. See, e.g., Bradley Karkkainen, Marine Ecosystem Management and a "Post-Sovereign"
Transboundary Governance, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L. L.J. 113, 126 (2004).
20. See, e.g., CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUND., 2005 STATE OF THE BAY REPORT. The Foundation, the
largest NGO working to protect the Bay, has created a scale of the various environmental quality
parameters, with one hundred representing the Bay as the English explorer John Smith described it in
his narratives from the early 1600s. The grades in recent years have been around twenty-seven; the
Foundation's goal is for the Bay to reach 40 by 2010.
21. See Chesapeake Bay Program, Nutrient Trading Principles, available at http://
Chesapeakebay.net/trading.htm; see also Ann Powers, The Current Controversy Over Regulating
TMDLs: Contemporary Perspectives, TMDLs and Pollutant Trading, 4 RES COMMUNES: VT J. ENVT.
2, text at notes 119-29 (2002-03) (describing TMDLs and the Chesapeake Program).
22. Carol M. Rose, Demystifying Ecosystem Management, 24 ECOL. L. Q. 865, 868 (1997).
23. Id. Rose gives the example of the fishermen as the easiest thing to regulate and the setting of
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Applying the Rose view we can see that the Chesapeake Bay Program
failed to spread out the costs of supporting ecosystem management; this
failure prevented Bay managers from assessing the strength of the public's
desire for ecosystem health. It also kept people from feeling like
stakeholders, like owners of the ecosystem's integrity. When a new Wal-
Mart or housing subdivision is proposed at a highway interchange in a
rural county within commuting distance of the District of Columbia or
Baltimore, do people make the connection to the Bay, the oysters, or the
seagrass beds, and to the benefits of restoring the health of the Bay? The
costs people were asked to incur were not enough to give them a sense of
common ownership and a stake in the Program.
III. A DEUS EXMACHINA THAT MAY TURN TRAGEDY INTO COMEDY
Finally we come back to the story of an oyster. But not Crassostrea
virginica, the Eastern oyster that inspired the Oyster Wars and was the
object of the passions Professor Heller describes. Now, the restoration of
the Chesapeake has found a potential savior oyster. This one is the non-
native oyster, Crassostrea arkenensis, imported from Asia. Its resistance
to the diseases that plague the native oyster and the ease of its cultivation
suggest it could help restore both the estuarine ecosystem and the fisheries
of the Bay.
When the idea of introducing the Asian oyster was first mooted, the
governor of Maryland vehemently opposed it. Now, a new Maryland
governor has taken up the idea, directing his Department of Natural
Resources to pursue it with all deliberate speed." Not everyone is
convinced that the potential benefits of the introduction are worth the
significant risks to the remaining wild populations of the Eastern oyster
and to the neighboring estuaries that may find Asian oysters taking up
residence.2 6
In 2005, a Maryland environmental consultant petitioned the National
Marine Fisheries Service to list the Eastern oyster as endangered or
threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).27 The petitioner tried
to introduce a new narrative, one emphasizing the risk of extinction that
25. State of Maryland, Department of Natural Resources, In Focus, Non-Native Oysters,
available at http://www.dnr.state.md.us/dnmews/infocus/oysters.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2006); see
Nat'l Research Council, NONNATIVE OYSTERS IN CHESAPEAKE BAY (2004) at 15, available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10796.html.
26. See J. Jed Brown et al., When the World Is Not Your Oyster, 309 SCI. 244 (2005) (discussing
possible interstate conflicts over the introduction).
27. Wolf-Dieter N. Busch, Petition to List the Eastern Oyster (Crassostrea virginica) as
Threatened or Endangered Species, at http://www.eiadvisoryservices.com (cover letter, Jan. 5, 2005)
("I am distressed by the slow and disorganized effort to restore the Chesapeake Bay's ecosystem....
Although restoration is still very viable Maryland is looking at a unilateral "quick fix" to resolve low
oyster abundance by introducing the Asian oyster. The current very low abundance of the eastern
oyster, coupled with its stressed environment seems to require action to protect the species.").
[Supp.:49
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the Eastern oyster faces, not the least of which is brought about by the
proposed introduction of a non-native, potential competitor species. When
the Fisheries Service announced that the listing petition had met the first
regulatory hurdle and requested public comment on the proposal,28 a
firestorm of criticism was unleashed, including a well-worn counter-
narrative about the taking of private property rights by capricious
bureaucrats.29
It seems that in the twenty-first century, the oyster is again providing
stories for many different sides. But we do not yet know which story will
hold the most sway. Will the story of a fast-growing, disease-resistant
oyster that can restore the Bay's health and the fisheries' prominence
overcome the fear of unleashing an invasive species that resists control or
eradication? Will the public right to a native oyster fishery in neighboring
states rear its head and stop the introduction? °
Professor Heller is correct that the oyster has inspired a "constantly
shifting matrix of strategies, simultaneously public and private, individual
and community, [under] constant renegotiation and interpolation."31
Whether it will survive this century depends on the ability of those, like
W.K. Brooks, whose special vantage point allows them to see the
sediment and sentiments most clearly, to persuade the rest of us to come to
the table, put our forks down, and listen.
28. 90-Day Finding on a Petition to List the Eastern Oyster as Endangered or Threatened, 70 Fed.
Reg. 28510 (May 18, 2005)..
29. Statement of Representative Richard Pombo, Chair, House Resources Committee, Eastern
Oyster Hearing, July 19, 2005, at http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/archives/109/testimony/
2005/pombo071905.htm; see also Kate Madin, Should Eastern Oysters Be Put on the Endangered
List?, OCEANUS MAG., Nov. 4, 2005, at http://www.whoi.edu/oceanus/viewArticle.do?id=8006
&archives=true.
30. See Brown et al., supra note 26.
31. Heller, supra note 2, at 44.
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